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The study of the artistic and intellectual movement known as Negritude is, 
in my view, among the most rewarding paths of research currently available 
to the student of Africana philosophy. This is so because of the challenging 
theoretical questions raised by the work of Negritude thinkers, whether one 
is reading the famous trio of Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal, Aimé 
Césaire of Martinique, and Léon-Gontran Damas of French Guiana, or others 
like the subjects of T. Denean Sharpley-Whiting’s 2002 book, Negritude 
Women (i.e., Jane Nardal, Paulette Nardal, and Suzanne Césaire, all of 
Martinique). Understanding and evaluating their work requires thinking 
critically about how race relates to culture and how investment in black 
culture relates to anti-racist politics. What is culturally distinctive about 
black people? How compatible is pride in black culture with a cosmopolitan 
outlook that sees value in the intermixing of diverse cultures? Does a focus 
on the cultivation of cultural identity distract from or push forward the 
political struggles for social transformation needed to end racism? Questions 
like these are forced upon us by the texts of Negritude, along with 
methodological questions like how we ought to understand the relations 
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between the philosophical prose, the celebrated poetry and other creative 
writing, and the activities while holding political office of the most famous 
Negritude thinkers. 
If I am right about how rewarding the study of Negritude is, then it is 
our good fortune to be living in a time where scholarly interest in Negritude 
in the English-speaking world appears to be on the rise. Earlier in the 
present decade, Donna V. Jones critically engaged Negritude and its 
relationship to the thought of Henri Bergson in The Racial Discourses of Life 
Philosophy: Négritude, Vitalism, and Modernity (Columbia University Press, 
2010), F. Abiola Irele collected his important writings on the subject in The 
Negritude Moment: Explorations in Francophone African and Caribbean Literature 
and Thought (Africa World Press, 2011), and John Patrick Walsh gave us Free 
and French in the Caribbean: Toussaint Louverture, Aimé Césaire, and Narratives 
of Loyal Opposition (Indiana University Press, 2013). Significant translations 
appeared, like my translation of Souleymane Bachir Diagne’s book on 
Senghor, published as African Art as Philosophy: Senghor, Bergson and the Idea 
of Negritude (Seagull Books, 2011), and the collection of Suzanne Césaire’s 
writings, The Great Camouflage: Writings of Dissent (1941-1945) (Wesleyan 
University Press, 2012), edited by Daniel Maximin and translated by Keith L. 
Walker.1  
But if the early part of the decade brought a steady flow of texts, then 
the years 2014 and 2015 have delivered a veritable explosion. The five books 
under review were all published over the course of those two years. My 
intention in what follows is to discuss interpretive tendencies and the 
conflicts between them discernable in these books, to say something about 
what contribution each book makes to our understanding of Negritude, and 
to close with a focused examination of the treatment of Senghor in three of 
the books. How to make sense of Senghor and assess his continued 
relevance emerges as a particularly important challenge when reading the 
books under review. 
 
European or African? 
Saving the case of Senghor for later, the trend that stands out when reading 
these books, in my view, is a general concern about how intellectually 
European or African the Negritude thinkers were. In Carrie Noland’s Voices of 
Negritude in Modernist Print, we are asked to consider the significance of 
Negritude poetry being a matter of printed texts in French rather than 
something primarily oral or written in languages or language varieties other 
than standard French. The Negritude poets are interpreted and evaluated as 
members of the “typosphere” – “that uniquely modern (post-Gutenberg) 
world in which paper and typeface are the matter of words” (1). Their 
publications, particularly those by Césaire and Damas, are further 
contextualized with reference to the wider array of modernist experiments 
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undertaken by French poets at the time they were writing, often in the same 
journals in which some of their works were initially published. While 
recognizing the distinctive intention of Negritude poetry to articulate a 
certain black experience and identity, Noland emphasizes the medium they 
chose to accomplish this task in a way that encourages us to see these poets 
as deeply embedded in a European literary landscape. When discussing 
Damas, for example, she questions attempts to associate his style with the 
musical rhythms of Africa or the African diaspora and turns our attention 
instead to the textual rhythms of interwar socialist poetry in France (chapter 
4). 
We see something like the opposite move in Cheikh Thiam’s Return to 
the Kingdom of Childhood and Reiland Rabaka’s The Negritude Movement. 
Despite not including his name in its title, Thiam’s book is focused 
completely on Senghor and aims to provide, with reference to Senghor’s 
work, an “Afri-centered reading of the philosophy of Negritude” (6). Thiam 
claims that too many have dismissed Senghor’s output as a mere “reaction 
to colonization” irrelevant to a postcolonial world, rather than recognizing it 
as a complex philosophical system worth our continued attention (5). He 
also argues, however, that those who have recognized its philosophical 
nature have failed to do justice to its African character. For example, the way 
that Jones and Diagne treat Bergson as foundational to Senghor’s thought, 
thus privileging his connection to a European philosopher, means for Thiam 
that they have fallen short of “producing a truly decolonial reading of 
Negritude” (6). What is needed and what Thiam tries to achieve is a reading 
of Senghor’s philosophy that focuses on the “African foundation of his 
methodology” and that demonstrates how his thought is “rooted in African 
realities” (6, 11). 
The structure of Rabaka’s book is indicative of his concern to place 
Negritude in an Africana rather than European genealogy of ideas. 
Following his preface, his introduction is entitled “Du Boisian Negritude: 
W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk, and the Origins of the Negritude 
Notion” and then the first chapter is “Prelude to Negritude: The New Negro 
Movement, the Harlem Renaissance, and the Early Evolution of the 
Negritude Notion.” The second, third, and fourth chapters are on Damasian, 
Cesairean, and Senghorian Negritude, respectively, while the fifth and final 
chapter, in what is bound to be a surprise for readers familiar with Africana 
thought, is entitled “Fanonian Negitude.” I will not yet evaluate Rabaka’s 
controversial proposal that Frantz Fanon, who is generally seen as one of 
Negritude’s major critics, should be seen as in a way carrying the movement 
forward. The point, for now, is that, when looking at the genesis and impact 
of Negritude, Rabaka is concerned to highlight relationships of influence 
among black intellectuals, in opposition to what he perceives as a tendency 
to pay lopsided amounts of attention to white sources of inspiration. There 
exists, in his view, a “predisposition to read the Negritude Movement as a 
C h i k e  J e f f e r s  |  3 0 7  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 2 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.753 
discursive derivation of the French intellectual tradition, especially French 
Marxism, surrealism, structuralism, existentialism, and phenomenology” (4). 
Without intending to deny its connections to French thought, Rabaka aims 
to disturb this predisposition and focus on Negritude’s place in “the 
continental and diasporan African intellectual tradition – which is to say, the 
Africana intellectual tradition” (4). 
F. Bart Miller’s Rethinking Négritude through Léon-Gontran Damas, 
which provides readings of four of Damas’ works, is arguably the exception 
to the trend I am discussing, as Miller is not concerned to reclaim Damas 
from others accused of either ignoring or overemphasizing his participation 
in European lineages of art and thought. A central theme of Miller’s book is 
Damas’ experimentation with different genres of writing, including lyric 
poetry, ethnographic essays, and the retelling of folktales, and while this 
leads him at times to talk of how Damas engages with and subverts 
European traditions (as in the case of ethnography), at other times it means 
talking of how Damas draws upon Afro-Caribbean traditions (as in the case 
of folktales). Miller says only a little about the influence of European writers 
on Damas, but neither does he say much about Africana influences beyond 
Damas’ fellow creators of Negritude, Senghor and Césaire.  
Gary Wilder’s Freedom Time is, like Miller’s book, not readily 
identifiable as on one side or the other of the debate, but this is not because it 
is an exception to the trend of intervening in the debate. Determining how 
exactly Negritude thinkers stand in relation to Europe has been a task that 
Wilder has explicitly pursued since his previous book, The French Imperial 
Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism between the Two World Wars 
(Duke University Press, 2005). Freedom Time can be seen as a sequel to The 
French Imperial Nation-State in a number of ways – for example, the earlier 
book focuses on the interwar period while the new book focuses on the 
postwar period (from 1945 to 1960). Viewed as a sequel, though, one of the 
most interesting aspects of Freedom Time is its shift away from the critical 
angle in The French Imperial Nation-State, in which Wilder argued that the 
evolving contradictions of the French colonial project led Negritude thinkers 
to articulate responses to colonialism that were impressively creative but 
also beset by contradictions of their own. Freedom Time, by contrast, invites 
us to reflect on the coherence, insight, and exciting potential of the visions 
for transforming France and its empire that Senghor and Césaire, in 
particular, elaborated in the postwar period. 
Thus, in Freedom Time, Wilder intervenes in the debate about how 
European or African/Africana the Negritude thinkers are by making a 
powerful case for their transcendence of this distinction, at least during this 
particular period. Senghor and Césaire sought to end colonialism, Wilder 
argues, by proposing forms of political integration that would “reconstitute 
France itself, by quietly exploding the existing national state from within” 
(2). They refused to assume that decolonization for Africa and the Caribbean 
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required independence from France, envisioning instead possibilities such 
as “a decentralized democratic federation that would include former 
colonies as freely associated member states,” thus rupturing the 
“presumptive unity of culture, nationality, and citizenship” in France (2). As 
Wilder presents them, what these two Negritude thinkers managed to 
conceive and make plausible at that time was the possibility of allegiance to 
Europe and allegiance to a liberated Africa and African diaspora being one 
and the same thing. 
Wilder clearly offers the most striking answer to the question of how 
intellectually European or African the Negritude thinkers are, which does 
not, of course, mean that he is therefore right while the other authors who 
take a position are wrong. Indeed, I think there is something right in what 
each author says, along with, in each case, the danger of taking the point too 
far. Noland is right that we should avoid treating the intention on the part of 
Negritude poets to illustrate and explore black difference as if it implies 
sharp separation from their French literary milieu. On the other hand, in 
order not to take this point too far, we should avoid downplaying the 
significance of that intention and its indication of real cultural difference 
undiminished by the choice to write in French, undertake certain 
experiments of form, and publish in modernist venues. Thiam and Rabaka 
are thus right to emphasize the emergence of Negritude out of Africana 
experiences and intellectual traditions. On the other hand, this point can also 
be pushed too far, as no obstinate preference for Africana contextualization 
will change the reality that Negritude writing is deeply influenced by 
European art and thought. 
Where does this leave us? Should we simply say that Negritude is 
equally a product of both Africa and Europe? This is too easy and the claim 
of equal amounts is especially suspicious. How are we quantifying the 
elements involved? Even if the equality claim is fine, is there no tension or 
friction to be accounted for here, given that Negritude is a movement 
championing African cultural identity in response to European racism? Are 
there no differences between the various Negritude thinkers to be 
acknowledged when weighing European versus African cultural formation? 
The simple answer of saying “it’s both” is true but unsatisfying. Any 
worthwhile attempt to address Negritude’s cultural roots must say and 
substantiate what “both” looks like in this case. This is, as a matter of fact, 
what makes Wilder’s Freedom Time not merely striking but convincing and 
worthy of high praise. It is an eye-opening study of two thinkers and 
political actors during a particular period, concentrating on a particular 
topic (the political relationship of postwar France to its colonies in Africa 
and the Caribbean), featuring careful analysis of ideas expressed in 
speeches, essays, and creative works, and charting the evolution of those 
ideas over the course of the period. It is no mere assertion of “both.” 
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General Comments 
Let me now move from this specific theme to discussing what contributions 
in general these five books make to our understanding of Negritude. My 
positive estimation of Wilder’s book has been made evident above, but let 
me be even clearer: Freedom Time is a fantastic work of political theory and 
one of the most original and insightful pieces of scholarship on Negritude I 
have read. Its historical narrative unfolds through an effective movement 
back and forth between the two Negritude thinkers covered: chapters 2, 5, 
and 7 focus on Césaire and Martinique while chapters 3, 6, and 8 focus on 
Senghor and French West Africa. Chapters 1 and 9 introduce and conclude 
the book, respectively, and then there is chapter 4, a transitional chapter that 
includes discussions of, among other things, Jean-Paul Sartre on the 1944 
liberation of Paris, Hannah Arendt on freedom, Albert Camus on the 
possibility of international democracy, Simone Weil on what France should 
do with its colonies, the postwar activities of Charles de Gaulle, and, finally, 
Immanuel Kant, Guiseppe Mazzini, and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon on 
federalism and cosmopolitanism. Ideas are explained in relation to their 
historical context and Wilder usefully places the Negritude thinkers into this 
network of ideas – a network not primarily of influence, to be clear, but 
rather of shared themes and of parallel relations to historical moments. The 
depth of theoretical engagement and parade of information may make this a 
slow read for some, but it is a worthwhile task. 
Thiam’s Return to the Kingdom of Childhood is an important book 
because it is, if I am not mistaken, the first book written in English whose 
self-conscious aim is the recognition and interpretation of Senghor as a 
systematic philosopher. It is worth noting, by the way, that Thiam was 
trained in comparative literature, Wilder in anthropology and history, and 
Rabaka in African American Studies, but all three have given us books that 
directly address the philosophical contributions of Negritude thinkers and 
prepare the way for professional philosophers to engage with them. Thiam’s 
book is a passionate and creative plea for taking Senghor seriously as a 
theorist of race, time, and epistemology. Thiam demonstrates a thorough 
knowledge of Senghor’s oeuvre, both prose and poetry. There are moments 
when he sheds new light on even the most famous of works by Senghor, 
such as the intriguing interpretation in the book’s third chapter of Senghor’s 
iconic poem, “Femme noire,” as a celebration of cultural mixture (85-86). 
While Thiam can be credited with proposing many intriguing 
interpretations, though, some of his conceptual moves are unclear in ways 
that make it hard to accept his proposals. The book’s second chapter, 
“Negritude, Epistemology, and African Vitalism,” begins by identifying 
Bergson’s theory of duration as a “pre-condition” of Senghor’s philosophy, 
which is confusing given his complaint about Jones and Diagne’s emphasis 
on Bergson, mentioned above (38). This, however, is a minor complaint 
about order of presentation, as the final sections of the chapter do useful 
3 1 0  |  R e c e n t  W o r k  o n  N e g r i t u d e  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 2 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.753 
work in showing how we might think of Senghor’s views as rooted, first and 
foremost, in African traditions. What is more severely confusing are the 
notions of time and race that Thiam introduces here. He tells us that Senghor 
develops a “fluid understanding of time,” one which moves away from “a 
common separation of past, present, and future to the conception of time as 
the constantly becoming present ceaselessly reborn” (40). What does this 
mean? As he explores the depiction of time in one of Senghor’s poems (“Que 
m’accompagnent koras et balafong”), it is difficult to tell if he is just making 
plausible points about how different times may lose distinction and order in 
one’s memory or asking us to consider bolder, more dubious metaphysical 
claims about past, present, and future being indistinguishable.  
Connecting time with race and culture, Thiam claims: “Following 
Senghor’s logic, one can state that even if the diverse cultures of continental 
Africa or of the Diaspora are bound to constantly become other, they remain 
African in that their present is inseparable from their past, since past-
present-future participate in the same movement of becoming” (44). There 
may be plausible ways of treating past and present as inseparable (as 
opposed to indistinguishable), but Thiam does not clarify this thought in 
ways that help us make sense of Senghor. He claims that, on Senghor’s view, 
the inseparability of past and present shows that there is “no reason to fear 
acculturation and no need to attempt to retrieve supposedly lost African 
roots” (45). Senghor does not, in fact, view the loss of culture as something 
we need not fear and the quotation from his essay, “What the Black Man 
Contributes,” that Thiam treats as evidence for his interpretation makes the 
sociohistorical claim that slavery acted as a compensating force vis-à-vis the 
change in environment and miscegenation with regard to the retention of 
African culture in the Americas. That is not a statement about the nature of 
time but about the contingencies of history. 
I will have more to say about Thiam on race below. For now, let me 
move to discussing the importance of Rabaka’s The Negritude Movement. The 
genealogy Rabaka constructs is, in my view, usefully accurate in its 
identification of the antecedents of Negritude, thought-provoking in its 
ordering of the Negritude thinkers, and brilliantly provocative in naming 
Fanon as Negritude’s heir. In my dissertation, The Black Gift: Cultural 
Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism in Africana Philosophy (Northwestern 
University, 2010), I too sought to highlight the lineage of thought connecting 
Du Bois and Negritude, so I am happy to see Rabaka demanding recognition 
of Du Bois’ significance in relation to the movement.2 The chapter on the 
Harlem Renaissance develops our understanding of this lineage in 
interesting ways – for example, by insisting on distinguishing the New 
Negro movement, of which Du Bois is said to be the “maestro,” from the 
Harlem Renaissance, with Alain Locke as “ringleader” (41, 42).  
It is a significant contribution of his book that Rabaka moves next to 
bring Damas to centre-stage. Damas is, as Rabaka notes, “routinely 
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marginalized in literary and intellectual histories of Negritude” in 
comparison with Senghor and Césaire (89). As Rabaka points out, though, 
Damas played a major role in making connections with the Harlem 
Renaissance and he was the first of the trio to publish books, whether poetry 
(1937’s Pigments) or prose (1938’s Retour de Guyane). These factors and others 
lead Rabaka to boldly suggest that we start viewing Damas as the most 
appropriate “point of departure for those interested in the history, 
interpretation, and criticism of the Negritude Movement” (89). Even as 
someone who ultimately remains more interested in the work of Senghor 
and Césaire, I find the case Rabaka makes for centering Damas impressive.3 
Also extremely useful is Rabaka’s invitation in the chapter on Damas to 
consider the influence of what is known as the Haitian Renaissance on 
Negritude, with a particular focus on the influence of Jean Price-Mars on 
Damas. 
What should we make of Rabaka’s contention that Fanon may be seen 
as in some sense a part of the Negritude movement? This thesis is 
provocative given that Fanon appears critical of Negritude in both of his 
major works (Black Skin White Masks and The Wretched of the Earth) but 
brilliant as it rests on a simple and plausible argument. Sartre is commonly 
taken to be an important influence on Fanon and traces of this influence are 
part of why we think of Fanon as an important existentialist thinker. It is 
also the case, however, that Fanon appears critical at times of Sartre – 
including, most famously, with respect to Sartre’s treatment of Negritude. 
Rabaka asks: “If, indeed, Fanon’s critique of Sartre is not interpreted as a 
complete discursive disavowal, why then is his selective critique of Cesaire, 
and the Negritude Movement more generally speaking, routinely taken as 
an outright repudiation of each and every aspect of Negritude?” (254). 
Evidence of the influence of Césaire, especially, on Fanon’s thought is not 
hard to discern, which is unsurprising, as it should be remembered, after all, 
that Fanon had Césaire as a teacher in Martinique. Rabaka concludes that 
Fanon should be seen as Negritude’s “most illustrious intellectual heir” (36). 
This novel approach to Fanon and Negritude is insightful, in my view, 
although once we go beyond the simple argument above to consider all that 
Rabaka says in his chapter on Fanon, the case he is making turns out to be 
weaker than it seemed. The problem, as I see it, lies in Rabaka’s treatment of 
that memorable part of the fifth chapter of Black Skin White Masks where 
Fanon discusses “Black Orpheus,” Sartre’s introductory essay to an 
anthology of poetry edited by Senghor. This essay did much to popularize 
the term “Negritude,” but Fanon describes experiencing Sartre’s essay as a 
fatal blow to the activity of young black poets because of its closing 
depiction of Negritude as stage in a dialectical process in which the thesis is 
the affirmation of white supremacy, Negritude is the antithesis, and the 
synthesis is the achievement of a society without race. Negritude is thus, 
according to Sartre, dedicated to its own destruction. Rabaka treats Fanon as 
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standing up for Negritude in reaction to paternalistic racism on Sartre’s part. 
He writes: “Fanon felt that Sartre missed the main point of Negritude, which 
was to remind “Negroes” that they were Africans before they were racially 
colonized and coerced into accepting their “Negrohood”” (282). 
This interpretation is puzzling for a number of reasons, starting with 
the idea that it could be the main point of the movement known as Negritude 
to distinguish Negrohood from being African and uphold the latter over the 
former (“Negrohood” is, in fact, a plausible way to translate the term 
“Négritude”!). Beyond this, the problem is that Fanon’s position here is a 
slippery one and Rabaka fails to communicate this. What does it mean when 
Fanon says that “I needed to lose myself totally in negritude… I needed not to 
know”?4 That Sartre “shattered my last illusion”?5 There is, apparently, 
criticism of Sartre here as well as, at least apparently, an admission that 
Sartre was somehow telling the truth about what Negritude is. My reading 
of Fanon’s criticism of Sartre is that, at least with respect to the question of 
the nature of Negritude, there is no criticism here at all but rather simply an 
expression of anguish at what Fanon takes to be the failure of Negritude to 
deliver what it appeared to promise: an autonomous black identity. As I 
have admitted the slippery nature of the text, I accept that this proposed 
reading is controversial. My biggest complaint about Rabaka’s reading, 
though, is that he does nothing to show how what he says can be reconciled 
with the concluding chapter of Black Skin White Masks, in which Fanon seems 
to radically reject not just Negritude but all forms of black pride. 
Let me now move from Wilder, Thiam, and Rabaka to the books of 
literary criticism, which I am somewhat less well-positioned to evaluate 
given my training as a philosopher rather than literary critic. I take the 
general position, however, that analyses by literary critics of Negritude 
poetry and other creative writing are useful for those with philosophical 
interests in Negritude, given the shared goal of making sense of what is 
going on in the texts produced by the movement. Noland’s Voices of 
Negritude in Modernist Print is quite an impressive contribution to our 
understanding of Negritude in light of its theoretical sophistication and its 
very close readings of the works it considers. Noland is spectacularly 
attentive to words: how they sound, their morphological relations, the way 
they are organized on the page, their connotations, and how any of these 
features may relate to any of the others. 
Where I would criticize the book is, as referenced before, in relation to 
the question of how much significance we accord to the intention of 
Negritude poets to offer us something distinctively black in their work. I 
sometimes wondered, while reading, whether it might even be appropriate 
to describe Noland’s approach as Schuylerian. What I have in mind is the 
critical position on the Harlem Renaissance that George Schuyler takes in his 
1926 essay, “The Negro-Art Hokum,” published in The Nation. He dismisses 
the idea of distinctively black art, arguing that black people, wherever they 
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are, make art in accordance with their cultural milieu: “As for the literature, 
painting, and sculpture of Aframericans – such as there is – it is identical in 
kind with the literature, painting, and sculpture of white Americans; that is, 
it shows more or less evidence of European influence.”6 Langston Hughes, 
the great Harlem Renaissance poet, responded to Schuyler in the same 
magazine with an essay entitled “The Negro Artist and the Racial 
Mountain.” As Rabaka points out, the Negritude thinkers later 
acknowledged this particular essay by Hughes as massively influential on 
their thinking (143). Hughes defends the goal of seeking to create 
distinctively black art: “it is the duty of the younger Negro artist… to change 
through the force of his art that old whispering “I want to be white,” hidden 
in the aspirations of his people, to “Why should I want to be white? I am a 
Negro – and beautiful!””7 
It is interesting that, in her third chapter, Noland discusses the 
influence of Hughes on Damas, particularly with regard to the 
typographical arrangement of words on the page, and she offers a close 
reading of Hughes’ 1934 poem, “Cubes” (111-116). Even here, though, she is 
concerned to point out that the “staircase” technique that Hughes and 
Damas employ has “a long history in French lyric poetry” and that, despite 
the fact that “critics who have noted the use of patterned lineation in 
Hughes or Damas have consistently related such patterning to the putative 
musicality of their poems,” what Hughes gives us in “Cubes” is a distinctly 
modernist reflection on the aesthetics of fragmentation pursued by the 
cubists (111, 115). I would not dispute Noland’s reading of “Cubes,” but 
note that it is important to Hughes that many of his poems involve attempts 
to “grasp and hold some of the meanings and rhythm of jazz” because he 
takes jazz to be “one of the inherent expressions of Negro life in America.”8 I 
worry that Noland does not do enough to help us understand intentions of 
this sort and to discern the result, whether in Hughes or the Negritude 
poets. 
Miller’s Rethinking Négritude through Léon-Gontran Damas feels relatively 
simple and straightforward when juxtaposed with the theoretical ambition 
and density of Noland’s book, which makes it both more accessible as well 
as less often awe-inspiring. (Note, by the way, that one important way in 
which it is decidedly not accessible is that none of the quotations from 
Damas or from any other French source are translated into English, so those 
who cannot read French are out of luck.) The book’s first chapter offers 
readings of selected poems in Pigments. These readings are sometimes 
insightful, although I found the terminology of adopting, adapting, and 
becoming adept in relation to colonialism that Miller takes from Peter Barry to 
be more often confusing than illuminating. The second chapter is a useful 
tour through many of the topics that Damas covers in Retour de Guyane, a 
unique critique of colonial governance of French Guiana. One oddity of the 
chapter, though, is Miller’s treatment of Damas’ remarks on the “rural man” 
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as remarks on “maroon descendants” or “the maroon population” (132, 133). 
I could not find the textual basis for this questionable identification. The 
third chapter is on Veillées noires, a collection of folktales. It presents a 
welcome opportunity to reflect on how the transmission of oral tradition can 
involve authorial choices that represent anti-colonial struggle. Finally, the 
last chapter is on Damas’ long poem, Black-Label, and it is an excellent 
discussion of a fascinating work. 
 
On Senghor  
I will now move from the general back to the specific in order to discuss 
how Senghor is portrayed in the books in which he is treated as a central 
topic – that is, in Rabaka, Thiam, and Wilder’s books.9 Let me first note a 
striking similarity in the ways that Rabaka and Thiam bring their books to a 
close. Thiam’s fourth chapter is entitled “Negritude is Not Dead!” and it is 
followed by a Conclusion, which ends with Thiam saying: “No, Negritude is 
not dead. It is more relevant now than ever” (121). Meanwhile, Rabaka ends 
his chapter on Fanon and his book as a whole with an italicized chant: “Long 
live the spirit of the Negritude Movement! Damasian Negritude lives! Cesairean 
Negritude lives! Senghorian Negritude lives! Fanonism lives!” (332). This concern 
with Negritude not being dead but rather continuing to live is obviously a 
response to widespread understandings of Negritude as being, in fact, an 
extinguished thing of the past. Among the reasons Negritude is seen this 
way is a perception of Senghor as having done the most to define Negritude 
and as having, in doing so, promoted a preposterous form of racial 
essentialism that has no place in the theorizing of black identity, culture, and 
politics today. After all, this is the man famous for writing “Emotion is 
Negro, as reason is Hellenic,” thus seemingly treating reason as culturally 
foreign to black people!10  When people like Thiam and Rabaka claim that 
Negritude is alive and well, then, an important question to ask is what they 
are proposing we do with Senghor. Are we striving to eradicate or at least 
complicate his reputation as a problematic essentialist whose practical 
relevance to current thought is nil?  
While Rabaka is kind enough to include Senghor in his closing chant, 
the real answer to that question for him is no. Senghor as depicted in 
Rabaka’s fourth chapter is by far the least respectable member of the 
Negritude movement. According to Rabaka, “[i]n sidestepping the political 
by collapsing it into the cultural, Senghorian Negritude connects with and in 
some senses becomes an imperialist agent for colonial policy, colonial 
anthropology, and colonial ethnology” (203). Senghor’s views are described 
as “politically impotent, insult-embracing, racism-accepting and 
colonialism-condoning” (210). His theory of African socialism is decried as 
insufficiently African and insufficiently socialist (214). In spite of what 
Rabaka has to say concerning Sartre’s wrongness about Negritude in the 
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chapter on Fanon, he concludes in the chapter on Senghor that Senghorian 
Negritude was “born only to die, because it cannot and does not exist 
outside of the Manichaean world and the imperial machinations of Europe” 
(209). 
Rabaka is, in my view, often unfair to Senghor and he sometimes 
displays a stunning insensitivity to the ways in which Senghor set out to 
construct a liberatory African cultural perspective. For example, Rabaka 
claims that Senghor “exhibits a hyper-consciousness of French and other 
Eurocentric views and values, and especially in terms of interpreting and 
articulating African history and culture, and… rarely reverses this practice 
and employs African views and values as a rubric for interpreting French 
and other European history and culture” (211). Then, soon thereafter, 
Rabaka describes Senghor’s famous claim about how the African encounters 
the object and does not assimilate it but assimilates himself into it. Rabaka 
argues that if the object is European culture, then Senghor is guilty of asking 
Africans to assimilate themselves into cultures “whose thought and 
behavior have historically been horribly xenophobic and jingoistic and, even 
more, downright brutal and genocidal, toward non-European cultures” 
(212). But one need not even be considering endorsing Senghor’s distinction 
between black and white ways of knowing as a factual distinction to notice 
that his description of the white way of knowing – analyzing, taking apart, 
assimilating the object, and using it for one’s own ends – is meant to evoke 
precisely the colonial exploitation and cultural oppression of non-Europeans 
that Rabaka thinks Senghor is failing to criticize! Indeed, it is central to 
Senghor’s thought that European culture can and must be critically 
interpreted and evaluated from an African point of view. 
Some weaknesses of Rabaka’s critical engagement with Senghor 
derive from strange choices in terms of the textual basis for the engagement. 
Rabaka quotes on a number of occasions from a 1996 anthology of African 
philosophy (Parker English and Kibujjo Kalumba’s African Philosophy: A 
Classical Approach) in which the editors pull selections from the popular 1965 
collection of Senghor’s writings, Prose and Poetry. Those familiar with the 
latter know that the prose section contains excerpts arranged thematically 
rather than chronologically and, in the 1996 anthology that Rabaka uses, one 
furthermore loses the dates and citations of original texts that one finds in 
Prose and Poetry. I find it irresponsible to encourage scholarly engagement 
with Senghor through reliance on such a text.  
Not even this inadvisable choice, however, can explain Rabaka’s 
strikingly bizarre claim that, in the 1960s, Senghor began to talk often of 
Africanité rather than Negritude because he “discovered that whites did not 
like the term Negritude and, in his incessant efforts to appeal to whites… he 
began using Negritude and Africanité, in most instances, synonymously 
depending on his intended audience” (207). This is utter nonsense, easily 
disproven through reading even just the titles of Senghor’s speeches over the 
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years, and Rabaka’s reference to the 1996 anthology naturally does nothing 
to support it. Rather, what is excerpted there – from a passage in Prose and 
Poetry that comes from a 1961 speech at the Ghanaian parliament 
unpublished outside of Prose and Poetry – makes it clear that Negritude is but 
one part of “Africanity,” which Senghor conceptualized as the values of the 
continent as a whole, not just black Africa.11 
Suffering through such problems in Rabaka’s book, one may find 
Thiam’s better knowledge of Senghor’s work soothing and one may be 
open-minded with regard to his project of showing how wrong it is to 
dismiss Senghor as a problematic essentialist. Unfortunately, I think what 
we find in Thiam is the opposite problem: rather than being unfair, Thiam is 
too nice to Senghor. According to Thiam, “Senghor’s conception of race is 
based on the postulation that although the existence of biological race is 
questionable, cultures do exist” (46). The claim that culture is central to 
Senghor’s understanding of race is right, obviously, but the idea that he 
takes the biological reality of race to be questionable is wrong, as he 
demonstrates his belief in a fundamentally important biological component 
to race from early in his work all the way to his 1988 book, Ce que je crois: 
Négritude, Francité, et Civilisation de l’Universel (the book features a chapter 
entitled “From Biology to African Culture”!). Thiam attempts to treat culture 
and biology as disconnected in relation to race in a way that it seems clear 
Senghor would not accept. 
  This faulty approach to Senghor on race leads in the book’s fourth 
chapter to a seriously problematic discussion of how we might relate Du 
Bois and Senghor. Thiam claims that Senghor’s Negritude “corrects” Du 
Bois (94). The first basis for the claim is a surprising treatment of Du Bois’ 
notion of double consciousness as somehow tied to the same biological 
essentialism one can find in the work of Count Gobineau. It is not my view 
that Du Bois avoids racial essentialism completely, but the idea of twoness 
that Thiam targets is definitely not a clear instance of him falling into this 
problem and Thiam makes no convincing case for seeing it as such. The 
second basis for the claim is the assertion that Senghor’s concept of time 
“makes possible an understanding of mixture as fundamental to the very 
being of races” (98). I have already pointed out that the conception of time 
Thiam is evoking is mysterious. What is newly problematic here is the fact 
that Thiam never explains how the idea of mixture can be understood apart 
from the idea of a combination of things which might be recognized as 
somehow distinct and so his criticism that Du Bois fails to understand races 
as “originally mixed” seems incoherent (99). Thiam holds that Senghor can 
reveal for us the way that the Du Boisian idea of twoness is based on the 
“ontological mistake” of “the imagined possibility of separating the past 
from the present and therefore precolonial identity from postcolonial 
hybridity” (100). I can think of no way to read this claim that makes it 
simultaneously metaphysically plausible in its conception of time, 
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historically plausible in its conception of African American identity, and 
interpretively plausible in its reading of Du Bois. 
In Rabaka and Thiam, then, we have two diametrically opposed 
attempts to deal with the importance of Senghor and both of them fail. What 
can we learn from these failures? One obvious lesson is that doing justice to 
Senghor requires a fair account of his emancipatory intentions but also a fair 
account of his essentializing flaws. I think one is learning the wrong lesson, 
however, if one views these two failures as completely on a par. We have 
behind us a long history of Senghor being dismissed as irredeemably 
flawed. It is therefore unclear to me why we should expect to get much out 
of further consideration of Senghor if criticisms are not at least balanced and 
better yet exceeded by efforts of the type Thiam is making – that is, efforts to 
identify the value in continuing to read Senghor and his ability to speak to 
our current context. 
This is certainly part of the value of Wilder’s treatment of Senghor. 
Freedom Time exposes Senghor’s brilliance as a political thinker in a way that 
can usefully be read as responding to some of Rabaka’s criticisms (in 
advance, as Wilder’s book was published first!) and, shockingly, also to 
Thiam, who wrongfully concedes to critics that “Senghor has never  
seriously engaged the political question of decolonization” (23). The last 
chapter of Freedom Time includes a sober reflection on whether present day 
conditions vindicate Senghor’s ideas from 1940s and 1950s about how 
territorial nationalism was bound to fail and how self-determination without 
state sovereignty was preferable. Wilder writes: “Following his imagined 
framework, Africans sans papiers in metropolitan France would not be 
foreigners demanding hospitality but citizens whose rights of mobility, 
family reunification, social security, and political participation were legally 
protected” (244). Wilder is critical as well, though, constantly reminding us 
that, in talking about the ideas of Senghor and Césaire as missed 
opportunities, he is not saying that they had everything worked out and that 
things would have necessarily gone as envisioned. One criticism that stands 
out for me: “Although [Senghor] argued that this democratic federation 
would be consonant with other forms of solidarity, such as pan-Africanism 
and socialist internationalism, and despite his interest in federating 
autonomous states within West Africa, he did not work out the mediations 
between these distinct levels of African political identification” (164). 
In any case, Freedom Time is a study of but one aspect of Negritude 
thought and activity during a particular period. There is so much more work 
to be done, on Negritude in general and on Senghor’s thought over the 
course of his lifetime. Like Rabaka and Thiam, I too believe that Negritude is 
not dead, that Negritude lives on, that Africana philosophy is richer when 
the significance of this movement is recognized, appreciated, and explored. I 
am therefore grateful for the way that this flurry of recent books testifies to 
its vitality. 
3 1 8  |  R e c e n t  W o r k  o n  N e g r i t u d e  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 2 (2016)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.753 
                                                                
 
1 See my review of the latter in Vol. XXI, No. 1 (2013) of this journal. 
2 Oddly, though, Rabaka quotes at one point in the chapter (p. 31) from Senghor’s 1971 lecture, 
“Problématique de la Négritude,” but the passage he quotes does not mention Du Bois and he 
never quotes this remarkable characterization of Du Bois’ importance from that lecture: “One 
must always begin with W.E.B. Du Bois, who was truly “the father of the Negritude movement,” 
as Lilyan Kesteloot has written, because he was the first mind to think it in its totality and 
specificity, its aspects and its purpose, its objectives and its means.” Senghor, Liberté 3: 
Négritude et Civilisation de l’Universel (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1977), 274. Translation mine.  
3 When looked at from the perspective Rabaka gives us, it is curious that Damas is so absent from 
Wilder’s Freedom Time, especially since he received extensive coverage in The French Imperial 
Nation-State. As Wilder notes, Damas served for some years in the French National Assembly 
along with Senghor and Césaire during the postwar period (275n3). Did he not weigh in at all on 
the questions of political transformation with which Freedom Time is concerned?     
4 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2008), 113-
114.  
5 Ibid., 116. 
6 George S. Schuyler, “The Negro-Art Hokum,” in Winston Napier, ed., African American Literary 
Theory: A Reader (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 25. 
7 Langston Hughes, “The Negro Artist and the Racial Mountain,” in Napier, 30.  
8 Ibid., 29, 30. 
9 It is interesting to note that, for each of the three famous founders of Negritude, three of the 
books under review focus on that figure. I have just mentioned those with a focus on Senghor; 
for Césaire, see Noland, Rabaka, and Wilder; and, for Damas, see Miller, Noland, and Rabaka.  
10 Senghor, “What the Black Man Contributes,” trans. Mary Beth Mader, in Robert Bernasconi, ed., 
Race and Racism in Continental Philosophy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003), 
288. 
11 Senghor, Prose and Poetry, ed. John Reed and Clive Wake (London: Heinemann, 1965), 97. 
